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REFLEXIVE LAW AS A LEGAL PARADIGM
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Sanford E. Gaines"
One of the elements of the new fields of environmental
regulation is that they are regulating areas dominated by the use
of specialized knowledge and new technologies and thus
dependent on that form of expertise. Both the regulator and the
objects of regulation are then caught up in continually reflexive
processes and re-evaluations of the knowledge. By the use of so
many new technologies, we are also increasingly drawing upon
the future. It is a qualitatively new challenge for law to regulate
on areas which so extensively are drawing upon the future-in
the sense that there may be both comprehensive and possibly
significant, negative and unpredictable consequences.
Introduction: Why Sustainable Development
Needs New Paradigms
The quotation above captures the essential post-modem
dilemmas of legal regulation for the protection of the environment.
The dilemmas become even more acute when environmental protec-
tion is situated within the broader context of sustainable development,
which requires attention to economic and social factors as well as the
state of ecological systems. Moreover, sustainable development
particularly reminds us that today's decisions are "drawing upon the
future" and that we have equitable obligations to bequeath to future
generations a world that provides them with as many or more oppor-
tunities for their own self-realization as we currently enjoy for ours.
Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
Research for this essay was supported by a summer research grant from the
University of Houston Law Foundation.
I Inger-Johanne Sand, New forms of environmental law: The legal
regulation ofscientific constructions and changes in the relations of law, politics
and science-The case of applied genetic technology, ARENA / IOR, Univ. of
Oslo 103 (2001) (draft paper). Ms. Sand makes her observation in a paper on the
regulation of genetically modified organisms.
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At the same time, sustainable development's broad sweep
strains our intellectual grasp of its meaning and outruns the capacity
of our current legal and political systems to channel society's
activities toward its achievement. Professor Esty, in a moment of
cynicism, remarked that "sustainable development has become a
buzzword largely devoid of content ... a concept [that] provides little
policy traction."' While I take issue with Professor Esty's focus on
the term itself, there is no doubt that sustainable development needs
new paradigms to transform it from visionary rhetoric to a viable
political goal. The World Summit on Sustainable Development
showed a world desperately seeking effective sustainable develop-
ment policies and strategies. The desperation was reflected in the
new mantra of "governance" and the shifting emphasis in sustainable
development measures from "Type 1" traditional regulation and
government programs to "Type 2" non-regulatory private or public-
private partnership initiatives.3
This essay will consider whether the sociological construct
"reflexive law," which comes out of the German sociology of law
tradition, and some American offshoots such as "democratic
experiments" with non-regulatory schemes, might help sustainable
development resolve its conceptual dilemmas. Reflexive law has
immediate appeal because it speaks to the sustainable development
2 Daniel C. Esty, A Term's Limits, FOREIGN POLICY, Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 74-75.
3 See the explanatory note by the chairman of the Preparatory Committee
of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Partnerships/Initiatives to
strengthen the implementation of Agenda 21, available at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/prep2finalpapers
/wssd_descriptionof partnerships2.doc (undated; link available at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/prepcom3.html). In that note,
Type 2 measures are described as follows: "Partnerships and initiatives to
implement Agenda 21 are expected to become one of the major outcomes of the
World Summit on Sustainable Development. These 'second type' of outcomes
would consist of a series of commitments and action-oriented coalitions focused
on deliverables and would contribute in translating political commitments into
action."
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mandate for integrated decision making:' it normatively urges social
systems or subsystems (such as science, economics, the marketplace,
politics, and law itself) to communicate and to interact. Moreover,
reflexive law teaches that law works best by specifying procedures for
regulated entities to observe in striving for a complex objective like
sustainable development, without defining in advance a required
substantive outcome from those procedures. Yet this disavowal of
law's function in setting specific performance requirements means
that reflexive law softens law's substantive rigor, the compulsory
effect that may be needed to motivate changes in entrenched
unsustainable patterns of production and consumption. In short,
reflexive law opens important new perspectives on the role of law,
and democratic experiments offer concrete examples of the value of
non-mandatory approaches to some environmental problems, but
neither reflexive law theory nor our experimental experience justify
displacing the mandatory objectives of substantive environmental law
from their central role in achieving sustainable development.
This is an "essay" in the classic sense-an attempt, something
of an experiment in itself. The ideas presented here are still evolving in
my own mind, and I seek as much to provoke thoughtful criticism as to
persuade. In an earlier paper,5 Cliona Kimber and I discussed reflexive
law in the context of its use by environmental law reform advocates as
a theoretical foundation for certain systems of self-regulation directed
primarily at large industrial sources of pollution. We criticized most
self-regulation experiments for insufficient attention to the need for
public involvement-the participation of individuals, local communi-
ties, and non-governmental organizations-in the environmental
management choices for industrial enterprises. But we did suggest that
reflexive law principles could usefully inform and guide new
4 Esty, supra note 2, at 75. (Esty argues that "[iun pushing to overcome
policy fragmentation, the concept's authors overstated their case. ... In fact,
fostering development and protecting the environment are linked but separate
imperatives.")
5 Sanford E. Gaines and Cifona Kimber, Redirecting Self-Regulation, 13 J.
ENVTL L. & LITIG. 157 (2001).
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approaches to other sources of environmental harm not now effectively
regulated, such as agricultural producers or universities and hospitals.
In keeping with that suggestion, the current essay inquires whether
reflexive law might assist policy makers in devising legal tools to
promote sustainable development.
Reflexive Law and Its (Missing) Social Context
First, a brief introduction to reflexive law, a concept not
familiar to North American lawyers.6 The term "reflexive law" was
coined by German sociologist Gunther Teubner in a 1983 article
analyzing the late-20th century evolution of law.7 In Teubner's view,
modem law's first evolutionary stage was the "formal" private law of
the early twentieth century, which vindicated personal freedom of
action and primarily served to set rules governing the relations
between autonomous private parties. In law's second evolutionary
stage, which began in the 1930s and culminated in the mid-century
social welfare state, the law became "substantive" or purposive,
seeking to direct private action and state action to assure specific
outcomes for society as a whole. The Reagan-Thatcher political
revolution of the early 1980s reflected increasing skepticism about the
ability of substantive law to deliver the desired welfare results, but
neither was the law ready to return to earlier laissez-faire policies.
Teubner saw, then, an emerging "third way," and he sought both to
explain it and to show why it represented a normative improvement
over the first two stages of law for mediating the complexities of the
post-industrial world.
In this initial exposition of reflexive law, Teubner melded the
work of two other German sociologists, the systems analysis perspec-
tive ofNiklas Luhmann, which emphasized the aspect of coordination
6 For a fuller but still abbreviated exposition in the American literature, see
Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L.REv. 1227 (1995).
7 Gunther Teubner, Substantive andReflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17
L. & SOC'Y REV. 239 (1983).
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between social subsystems, and the arguments of Juergen Habermas
about the need for democratization of social subsystems to
institutionalize "procedural legitimation." Teubner thus included
attention to both the "procedures of internal discourse" within social
subsystems and to their "methods of coordination with other social
systems.",8 As he summarized it:
Putting the various elements we have discussed together, our
theses are: (I) Reflexion within social subsystems is possible
only insofar as processes of democratization create discursive
structures within these subsystems. (2) The primary function of
the democratization of subsystems lies neither in increasing
individual participation nor in neutralizing power structures but
in the internal reflexion of social identity.9
Teubner then made a further comment that is highly pertinent
to the idea of reflexive environmental law:
This brings us to the question of how autonomous reflexion
imposes limits on the scope of legality and defines the role of
law vis-A-vis other social subsystems. One possibility in vogue
today is the policy of the deregulation or reformalization of
substantive law. Another one is the policy of proceduralization
under which the legal system concerns itself with providing the
structural premises for self-regulation within other social sub-
systems. What is involved here is not only the guarantee of
autonomy for other social subsystems, but also Habermas'
concept of the 'democratization of social subsystems,' which-
with its stress on procedural legitimation-shows the direction
in which reflexive law can develop.'
In later writings, though, Teubner himself took reflexive law
in a different direction. He became more enamored of Luhmann's
systems theories, and less interested in Habermas's discursive
democracy. He also delved deeply into "autopoiesis," a biological
Id. at 255.
Id. at 273.
10 Id. at 274-75.
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concept about the self-reproducing, self-organizing, self-maintaining
character of cellular organisms that others had extended to the social
sphere." From this line of thinking, he restated the central question
for reflexive law:
How is it conceivable that the radical closure of legal operations
also means its radical openness in relation to social facts,
political demands, and human needs? .... My tentative answer is
that social regulation through law is accomplished through the
combination of two diverse mechanisms: information and
interference. They combine operative closure of the law with
cognitive openness to the environment. On the one hand, by
generating knowledge within the system itself, law produces an
'autonomous legal reality'. It orients its operations according to
this, without any real contact with the outside world. On the
other hand, the law is connected with its social environments
through mechanisms of interference which operate between
systems. The 'coupling' of the legal system with its actual
environment and the reciprocal restraints that arise from this are
the result of the overlapping of events, structures, and processes
within and outside the law.... One way of describing the joint
action of the two mechanisms of information and interference
would be to say that law regulates society by regulating itself.'"
Teubner insists that the proceduralization focus of autopoiesis
does not mean doing away with substantive legal norms. "[S]ubstan-
tive legal norms remain indispensable. It is only that the process of
their production and justification has to give way to a 'socially
adequate' proceduralization .... The question is whether we are
dealing with command and control regulation through state economic
policy or with regulation through decentralized mechanisms of self-
regulation. In the latter case, the law of the state regulates only the
contextual conditions." 3 This statement, though, indicates Teubner's
belief that substantive norms should be determined through
decentralized processes rather than through centralized legislation and
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (1993).
12 Id. at 65.
13 Id. at 67.
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regulation. Public law, in this model, is "relieved of the burden of
direct regulation ... and instead given the task of active control of
self-regulatory areas."' 4 Quite simply, in this version of reflexive law,
"Final decisions . . . are always the province of the regulated
entities."' 5
Teubner also insists that reflexive law is neutral on matters of
substantive legal policy. Inhis own words:
"Reflexive law" can ... be equated with neo-liberal conceptions,
strategies of deregulation and pluralist self-regulation. Social
autonomy, however, is first and foremost a cognitive problem for
the law. As far as the law is concerned, we are dealing with the
factual rather than the normative dimension of social autonomy.
Social autonomy presents lawyers or politicians with the prob-
lem of knowing what it is they are actually trying to regulate.
This is so irrespective of whether we are trying to unleash
market forces through legal policy or subject them to political
constraints.'
6
The third aspect of reflexive law is its mixed character as
description and prescription. "Here my aim is to defend the dual
character of the idea of reflexive law as both normative and analytic.
Reflexion in law means both empirical analysis and normative
evaluation.... First, we have to evaluate the current position of law
in a functionally differentiated society. Second, we have to consider
the operative consequences of such evaluation .... ""
Teubner himself asks the key regulatory question that his
analysis raises: "If autonomy is by definition self-regulation, how,
14 Gunther Teubner, After Legal lnstrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post
Regulatory Law, in DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE, 307(Gunther
Teubner, ed. 1986).
15 E. Bergman and A. Jacobson, Environmental Performance Review: Self-
Regulation in Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ECOLOGICAL
RESPONSIBILITY: THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF ECOLOGICAL SELF-
ORGANIZATION 207, 211 (Gunther Teubner, et al. eds., 1994).
16 TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 68.
17 114
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then, is legislation as external regulation possible?"'' Because
Teubner views the political system as a closed, autopoietic system in
itself, he tends to argue against "intervention" by politics into other
systems, such as the market or the legal system. But he refuses an
absolutist view on this point, suggesting instead that, "we have to
think of social systems as being autonomous to various degrees."'
) 9
Returning to his ideas about information and interference as the
mediating influences between different autopoietic systems, he
concludes: "The social validity of a (legal) norm can be a matter of
degree. The interference of legal and social norms transforms their
validity from a question of 'either-or' to one of 'more or less."'2 For
example, he believes that direct and highly intrusive regulation may
actually present problems of motivation because it engenders
resistance by the regulated system.2' On the other hand, he also
concedes that the contingency and instability of self-regulation
"undermines the role of law in securing expectations."22
By the time Teubner and colleagues tackle environmental
issues directly in 1994,23 Teubner expresses the view that law should
not "try to teach from the outside. Instead, the system must be
induced to produce more knowledge about itself and to reflect upon
this knowledge."2 The upshot is that "reflexive law" has increasingly
distanced itself from the two critical social elements of information
and interference-both of which are critical to the "democratizing
legitimation" of democratic discourse as urged by Habermas, as well
is Id. at 70.
19 Id. at 76.
20 Id. at 90.
21 Regardless of whether one thinks that the new source review regulations
under the Clean Air Act should be enforced as written or substantially revised, the
persistent avoidance of new source review by major emitting sources over the last
20 years is an example of resistance to intrusive regulation, with the possible
conclusion that the regulations are impeding rather than promoting emissions
reductions.
22 TEUBNER, supra note 11, at 94.
23 TEUBNER, supra note 16.
24 Id. at 5.
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as to effective integration of policy between subsystems such as
business, science, and politics.
In the context of sustainable development, the missing social
elements must be restored if reflexive "law" is to be accepted as an
element of the sustainable development legal system. The critical
roles of democratization and coordination help order the relationships
among many social subsystems and individuals. Sustainable develop-
ment, in particular, will require multiple initiatives by many different
sectors of society." Moreover, these multiple initiatives cannot
operate reliably or with legitimacy in the absence shared information
and mechanisms of social response to that information. Taking the
argument a step further, the social functions of information disclosure
and discourse between subsystems serve the core ideals of reflexive
law because they enhance learning by all the participants and foster
re-examination of (reflection on) attitudes and assumptions in all
subsystems, not just the subsystem that generated the information.
The benefits of these social functions for environmental policy are
obvious: a fully-informed public is likely to be more aware of
environmental considerations and to develop a more sophisticated
understanding of them. Awareness and sophistication increase, in
turn, when there are established channels for discourse within
subsystems and between systems about environmental information
and environmental values.
25 See, World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of Implementation,
advanced unedited text dated Sept. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.johannesburgsummit.org /html/documents/summitdocs
/2309_planfinal.doc . This Plan identifies 150 separate major tasks ranging from
the sweeplingly ambitious task of "poverty eradication" to mundane details like
promoting "broader use of information technology."
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Reflexive Sustainable Development Law in Practice
Procedural Environmental Law
Reflexive law emphasizes procedures to change the responses
of subsystems in the society. Changed responses imply changed
attitudes and changed ways of making decisions, as indicated by
many of the elements of sustainable development such as integration
of economic and environmental decision making, public participation,
and application of the polluter pays and precautionary principles.
Unconsciously, several familiar elements of the environmental law
landscape, some recent and some much older, have already adopted
reflexive law approaches. A brief review of these will illustrate the
contribution that reflexive law can make to the formulation of
sustainable development law.
Several laws or systems operate almost exclusively by requiring
more systematic collection of information and consideration of that
information by subsystem actors in selecting among options for
substantive actions or objectives. In public law, the requirement that
federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement on
proposed actions under the National Environmental Policy Act
(hereinafter NEPA) has been clearly defined by the Supreme Court as
a strictly procedural requirement.26 This makes NEPA quintessentially
reflexive; the agency is required to study and think about environmental
effects, but once the statement has been prepared, the agency is free to
choose a decision that is more environmentally harmful than other
options. After 30 years of experience with NEPA and thousands of
environmental impact statements, commentators remain divided about
how effective NEPA has been, but none suggest that it has had no
effect at all. The criticisms of NEPA, rather, point to the potential value
of further refinements to its procedural requirements, including more
26 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980) (holding that "once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's
procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to ensure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences").
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demanding standards about the amount of information to be collected,
tighter scrutiny of the analysis of the information, and the need for post-
project monitoring of observed effects and their comparison with pre-
project impact projections so that we can improve the "science" of
environmental impact assessment.
On the private side of environmental law, we have a reflexive
model in the recent development and implementation of a voluntary
"standard" for environmental management systems for companies,
the ISO 14000 series, especially 14001. This, too, is strictly
procedural (and like NEPA it is criticized by some on that ground).
It specifies in considerable detail the kinds of management systems
companies should have in place to address environmental issues, and
establishes a third-party auditing requirement to certify compliance
with the requirements. ISO 14001 says nothing at all about what
environmental practices a company should adopt, though it creates a
strong presumption that the company will require, at a minimum,
compliance with applicable regulations. Although the ISO standard
lacks substantive "teeth," the expectation behind environmental
management systems is that a company with a written environmental
management policy, a senior officer in charge of that policy, and
oversight of the policy by its board of directors is much more likely
to become aware of environmental problems and to act responsibly
to address them than a company that lacks such internal procedures.
Informational Law
Professor Karkkainen has studied another federal environ-
mental procedure-only statute and shown that the development and
disclosure of environmental information can, by itself, have an
important effect on environmental performance.27 The federally-
27 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI
and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257
(2001).
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mandated Toxic Release Inventory (hereinafter TRI)28 requires firms
to gather (or estimate) their releases into the environment-air
emissions, wastewater discharges, and disposal of wastes-of a
defined list of toxic substances. They must then submit that informa-
tion annually to the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter
EPA) and to state officials, and EPA in turn is required to make that
information available to the public through a computerized data base.
The TRI has had a powerful effect in four ways.
First, the requirement to collect the data, which most facilities
had not previously collected in a systematic way, informed the
enterprises themselves of their own activities in ways that were
unknown or obscure until this information was gathered. In true
"reflexive" fashion, many companies then took immediate, self-
initiated action to reduce their toxic releases. Karakkainen explains
how some companies took enterprise "reflexion" on the TRI data
further, using it within a company or even within a whole industry to
establish new "benchmarks" of environmental performance, inducing
further voluntary efforts to reduce the use of or release of these toxic
substances.
Second, the publication of the TRI put important information
into the hands of local citizens and national organizations, who were
then empowered to engage the enterprises in meaningful discussions
about what pollutants to reduce, and by how much.29 This had two
positive ramifications. Importantly, the community dialogue led to
further reductions in toxic releases that probably would not have
occurred through internal company efforts alone. In addition, though,
the new channels of communication led to overall changes in the
relations between the industrial facilities and their local host commu-
nities and created opportunities for resolution of other festering
28 The core reporting and publication requirement is in § 313 of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
29 See William M. Sage, Regulating through Information: Disclosure Laws
and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L.REV. 1701, 1823 (1999) (commenting
that the TRI primarily informed the already empowered (corporations) and did little
to inform or empower the vulnerable.)
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concerns about environmental management. For example, indepen-
dent groups have compiled and analyzed the TRI data to produce
maps of toxic releases by neighborhood, helping communities to
identify "hot spots" and seek corrective action.
Third, the TRI informed government authorities (Congress
and EPA), who used the information to revise existing toxic control
programs or devise new regulatory programs or requirements for
some of the toxic pollutants. The scale and variety of the toxic
releases, once revealed, had a transforming effect on government
attitudes toward and commitments to such programs as "pollution
prevention," and led as well to fresh consideration of information
disclosure as one tool to reduce public health and environmental risk.
Finally, Karkkainen describes some government programs in
otherjurisdictions (Canada and Massachusetts among them) that used
the TRI or comparable pollutant release information systems as a
springboard for additional initiatives relating to pollution reduction.
In the spirit of "democratic experimentalism,"3 these other programs
have added new objectives and new features to the basic TRI model
to address problems that TRI itself did not address.
Karkkainen makes a strong case for the effectiveness of
information disclosure in the specific instance of the TRI and certain
of its off-shoots. The question for the broader agenda of sustainable
development is whether the TRI example can be extrapolated to the
wider array of environmental challenges that firms and communities
face, challenges that are often more subtle or diffuse in their source,
or more difficult to track, or of less prominent social consequence
than the release of toxic substances.
My own first judgment is that there may be some, but not
many, untapped opportunities to follow the TRI model. I foresee
several problems in any broader effort to use information generation
and disclosure as the reflexive law "irritant" for inducing industry
learning and responsive action. First, information generation is
expensive, and firms will resist requirements to develop and collect
30 See infra discussion in Part III.B.
C
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information that is not vital, in their view, to either their own opera-
tions or the welfare of the community. Resistance will be especially
fierce if the information could be used by competitors to understand
confidential details of the facility's production or processes.
Second, there are problems (some of which Karkkainen
acknowledges) in determining what information to collect and how
to categorize it. Even with TRI, industry complained that public
reaction to the information was ill-informed; such objections could be
more telling in other situations where general public capacity to
interpret the information may, realistically speaking, be limited."
Controversies like this show that environmental information disclo-
sure requirements put a premium on the scarce skill of presenting
complicated scientific information in an accurate and understandable
way without being condescending.
Third, it can be expected that both a firm's and the public's
reaction to additional information may quickly become one of either
"information overload" or general indifference, so that the disclosure
of the information will fail to prompt any internally-motivated or
externally-forced environmental response.
"Democratic Experimentalism"
Looking beyond the narrow proceduralism of laws like NEPA
and the TRI to more elaborate systems of non-regulatory environ-
mental governance, Professor Karkkainen and his colleagues have
advanced a concept of "democratic experimentalism" based on
experiments in decentralized participatory decision making under the
overall coordinating supervision of national environmental authori-
31 Moreover, industry is seeking to exclude from TRI reporting the disposal
of wastes through deep-well underground injection, on the argument that this
method of disposal segregates the substances from the environment and should not
be considered a "release."
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ties. In another article,32 they examine several examples in which
locally-based private or quasi-public groups have managed local
ecosystems with greater flexibility and effectiveness than would have
been achievable through formal government programs. They idealize
this model in the following terms:
These local institutions ... devise measures to monitor and assess
their own performance and adjust their practice in light of actual
performance. In return for this autonomy, they produce detailed
reports on their plans, metrics, and performance. A central moni-
toring agency pools this information and makes it available to
other localities and the public generally. In consultation with
local actors, the central agency uses these data to periodically
reformulate and progressively refine minimum performance
standards, desirable targets, and preferred means to achieve
them.33
This is a shimmering image, but it strikes me more as a
fantasy than an achievable ideal. To be fair, the authors do not
suppose that every democratic experiment will meet all these expec-
tations. But if the expectations cannot be fulfilled are the experiments
really suitable?
In my view, if a democratic experiment lacks any one of six
key elements of the ideal, it becomes seriously flawed. My six key
elements are:
1) suitable local methods or metrics to assess performance;
2) sustained local effort to obtain the data for the assessment;
3) sustained local commitment to and implementation of a
process for adjustment of performance based on the
assessment;
32 Bradley C. Karkkainen, et al., After BackyardEnvironmentalism: Toward
a Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AMER.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 692 (2000). See also Michael C. Dorf and Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.REv. 267
(1998).
33 Karkkainen, supra note 31, at 693.
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4) preparation of the "detailed reports" to the central agency;
5) central review and evaluation of local initiatives and their
performance; and
6) commitment to and implementation of the process for
reformulating/refining minimum performance standards,
targets, and means of achievement.
Even federal agencies and large companies will have difficulty
in carrying out all of the assigned tasks. How likely is it that volunteer
community-based associations can meet all of these objectives?
Where will they get the expert assistance they need, and how will
they pay for it? Who will do the monitoring and assessment, and at
what cost? Who will have the time to serve on the committees and
write the reports?
The limited or partial successes the authors cite for localized
governance are less than persi4asive. One of their examples is the
long-running Chesapeake Bay Program, a collaborative effort among
the three main states in the bay watershed-Maryland, Virginia,
Pennsylvania-and the District of Columbia. Twenty years of study,
negotiation, action, and assessment have managed to arrest the
decline of the bay. Now it limps along as a degraded ecosystem far
less robust and productive than it was 200, or even 100, years ago.
This is certainly a case where one might argue that the glass is half
empty, not half full. Part of the governance problem through the years
has been an asymmetry of interests. The states along the bay
shoreline, Virginia and Maryland, are economic users of the bay and
will benefit from its protection, but Pennsylvania is the watershed for
most of the freshwater inflow and faces the greatest pollution control
costs. Even as between Maryland and Virginia there are differences.
Chesapeake Bay is absolutely vital to the economy and the identity of
Maryland, but has less symbolic and economic importance for
Virginia. Another problem, exemplified by Maryland, is the
proliferation of hazards to the bay and the difficulty of regulating
those hazards. Industrial and, to a great extent, agricultural pollution
have been brought under control, but the last 20 years have witnessed
an explosion of population and second-home development in
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Maryland's Eastern Shore that has set back much of the bay
restoration effort.
Stephen Nickelsburg makes a strong argument that there are
clear and not very distant limits to what can be expected of
community volunteer efforts.34 Nickelsburg cites the work of a well-
known researcher of community-based environmental governance,
Elinor Ostrom, who has deduced a set of conditions for the success
of local self-governance. Among the factors she identifies are: a
common judgment that the interested parties will be harmed if they
don't develop a new approach, relatively low information and
enforcement costs, and shared "generalized norms of reciprocity and
trust that can be used as initial social capital."35 Such situations exist
in small, relatively isolated, and relatively homogeneous communities
with relatively simple economic structures tied closely to environ-
mental conditions, and Nickelsburg describes some hopeful examples
with those characteristics. But those conditions are not readily
replicated. Even if one counts the Chesapeake Bay Program as a
success, other important bays with simpler political economies
involving only one state, such as San Francisco Bay, Galveston Bay,
and Massachusetts Bay, have not germinated the same deep and
sustained regional involvement.
I reach my cautiously pessimistic conclusion about democratic
experimentalism with reluctance. Public participation is an essential
ingredient of environmental policy, now appropriately enshrined as
one of the principles of sustainable development in the Rio
Declaration of 1992 and given more substantive international stature
with the coming into force of the Aarhus Convention on Public
Participation in Environmental Decision Making.36 Because most
34 Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-Based Environmental Protection, 84 VA. L. REV. 1371 (1998).
35 Id. at 1379.
36 UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, ECE/CEP/43,
38 I.L.M. 517 (1999) (adopted at Aarhus, Denmark on June 25, 1998, entered into
force Oct. 30, 2001).
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environmental harms arise out of complex circumstances to which
most of us contribute in small ways, community involvement of some
kind is essential to effective environmental management. The law
should do everything it can to promote, foster, and facilitate the
involvement of the public at large, and especially the local com-
munity most directly affected, at every stage, from identifying
problems to setting environmental protection or improvement objec-
tives to monitoring and enforcing the targets and the plans. But it is
one thing to advocate that the public participate in a structured
process overseen, if not managed or directly instigated, by govern-
mental authorities. It is quite another to suggest that the public, or the
community, can and should regularly become the manager itself.
Karkkainen and his colleagues are not insensitive to some of
the problems their model presents. They particularly address what
they call the "challenge to Madisonian arrangements" from demo-
cratic experimentalism. The local groups mix public officials with
private parties in the exercise of broad powers, blurring the lines
between the branches of government and also between public and
private spheres of action. A cautionary tale about the risks involved
comes in a case involving the protection of the Niobrara River, a wild
and scenic river in Kansas and Nebraska. Although the river itself
was under the jurisdiction of the federal government, all the abutting
land was privately owned. Protecting water quality and stream flow
in the river depended, then, on the cooperation of the landowners. Not
surprisingly, the Department of the Interior not only sought the views
and engaged the cooperation of local farmers in managing the river,
but to encourage and bind their cooperation it ceded to the farmers
substantial authority to make decisions affecting the river, checked
only by the power of the government to abrogate the arrangement. In
a case brought by a national environmental organization, however, the
court held that the government had created an impermissible
delegation of public authority to private individuals."
37 National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp. 2d. 7, 20
(D.D.C. 1999).
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To my way of thinking, the court in the Niobrara River case
reached the correct result. Even where local interests are the ones
most substantially affected by environmental management decisions,
and even though their views should be given great weight and their
participation in the management process encouraged, at the end of the
day the protection of the environment, even locally, is a matter
affecting the public welfare of the nation as a whole, indeed the
world. Some public entity with a perspective and a legal respon-
sibility of broader sweep should maintain final decision-making
authority.
A Ten-Point Working Hypothesis on Reflexive Law
for Sustainable Development
The preceding parts of this essay have set forth the basic
principles of reflexive law and their pertinence to the sustainable
development enterprise. They have demonstrated, too, that reflexive
law approaches have already been applied in United States environ-
mental law, albeit serendipitously rather than by conscious reference
to the theory. Though reflexive law analysis focuses on important and
often neglected dimensions of environmental policy, the practical
experience with reflexive environmental law also shows suggests the
limits of the approach and the pitfalls of trying to apply it in
inappropriate contexts. Substantive, purposive environmental law-
yes, command-and-control regulation-still has a vital role, especially
in helping to achieve the sweeping economic, social, and environ-
mental agenda implicit in "sustainable development." The following
ten propositions summarize the conclusions that I draw from this
analysis.
Point 1: Reflexive law instructs us to think about social
subsystems and how they interact. Looking through the reflexive law
lens, we can see that many environmental laws-and the public
debates about their possible reform-idealize or privilege one or
more subsystems and thereby threaten to create a tyranny of the
normative logic of that subsystem. Some laws imagine that "science"
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should determine policy, idealizing scientific validity or scientific
justification as a normative value. This leads to the tyranny of experts
and their data and the empowerment of the scientific subsystem,
which cannot be effectively judged by non-scientists. This
idealization of science provokes endless and ultimately fruitless
debates about what constitutes "sound" science or whether science
"alone" should define our environmental goals. Some laws, or
advocates for environmental law reform, idealize economics as the
normative subsystem. This threatens the tyranny of economic
efficiency or, in the public sector, quantified cost-benefit analysis.
The idealization of economics by the political right is matched by the
idealization of community and democratic choice on the left. The
autonomy of Athenian-style democracy symbolizes the normative
goal, validating the tyranny of local control. Community is vital;
culture and society is the important third dimension of sustainable
development. But too localized a conception of community leads to
incoherence in environmental policy. Sustainable development
demands holistic thinking and, ultimately, global strategies.
Point 2: In their idealized forms, each subsystem depends on
perfect information and unimpeded communication of that informa-
tion within the subsystem to reach its ideal condition. Economics
assumes the perfectly-informed market participant and often ignores
transaction costs. Idealized ideas of science assume that science can
provide singular "answers" about which all scientists will agree. The
ideal of democracy rests on the expectation that each citizen will be
or can be informed about the decisions to be made and that the
decision will be reached through a Habermasian process of honest
and open dialogue and unconstrained choice.
Point 3: Perfection of information and perfection in its
communication are unattainable objectives, so none of the idealized
solutions are valid. Legal structures that rely on assumptions of
perfection within the relevant subsystems cannot achieve their
intended goals, and may in some cases lead to contradictory or
erroneous outcomes. Theorists within each subsystem acknowledge
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the problem and strive to understand how their discipline performs in
the absence of perfect information. Nevertheless, mechanisms for
dealing with uncertainty, ambiguity, and inequity in the distribution
of information are poorly developed in both theory and practice.
Environmental laws that focus on the further development of
information and its communication represent one attempt to
overcome the imperfections of science, economics, and politics.
Point 4: As a corollary to points 2 and 3, we must accept that
information and its communication are not perfectable. Realistic
political choices and realistic legal systems should be built on the
premise of the persistence of imperfection in each of the subsystems.
Point 5: Having acknowledged in point 4 that no one
subsystem-be it economics or science or the democracy of local
community---can be relied upon to direct our social choices about
sustainable development, we can appreciate the value of mechanisms
that integrate thinking, that promote or even demand communication
between subsystems before decisions are made. Sustainable develop-
ment law should foster integrated policies that draw on elements of
all three subsystems, and indeed on inputs from other subsystems as
well. This means an emphasis on procedures and systems that
promote interaction among the subsystems and adaptation to new
information.
Point 6: The interdisciplinary approaches we need-which are,
emphatically, integrated approaches built on subsystem imperfec-
tions-will themselves be imperfect in the sense that they will tend
to represent unstable compromises among competing systemic
methods and values and social aspirations. Typical unstable compro-
mises in environmental policy include:
a) Rules that insist on national uniformity, and therefore
sacrifice some element of economic efficiency,
scientific validity, and/or community choice.
b) Rules that are either stricter than science warrants,
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typically in reaction to community concerns, or not
strict enough to address the environmental problem,
usually in response to economic concerns.
c) Rules that privilege local choice even in the face of
inadequate or spotty local effort to control well-
defined environmental harms.
Point 7: Reflexive law theory can help us to construct legal
structures and mechanism to enhance the performance of these
imperfect, unstable systems, because reflexive law has two major
objectives relevant in this context-to improve the capacity and
performance of the system to generate knowledge about itself and its
effectiveness, and to stimulate (the theorists sometimes say, to
"irritate") the system to reflect on this information and reform itself.
Point 8: The approach laid out in the first seven points is highly
unsatisfactory. It is theoretically inelegant, a pastiche of reflexive law
and substantive law that looks to Habermasian discourse but denies
that such discourse can be fully realized. It is messy; that is, it
will-indeed should-result in a jumble of ad hoc strategies for
differing situations. It is incoherent, in the sense that there it offers no
systematic criteria for choosing one approach over another, no firm
basis for any overarching consensus, and no prediction about environ-
mental outcomes.
Point 9: In spite of its unsatisfactory character, reflexive law
has two saving graces that are particularly appropriate for sustainable
development, which itself is incoherent, unpredictable, insufficiently
rigorous, and theoretically inelegant. First, it is adaptable to the
variability and complexity of environmental problems. Its inco-
herence and unpredictability, which are weaknesses for any of the
details in a system of laws, become cardinal virtues at the general
level because sustainable development is about adapting human
society to dynamic changes in the natural world, the capabilities of
human technology, and evolving social values. The second saving
grace of reflexive law is that it has a good chance of being perceived
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as politically and socially legitimate precisely because it calls for
integration and compromise among disputed and often competing
social objectives. Reflexive law focuses on procedure and
communication, which are the essential ingredients of legitimate
decisions about law in democratic societies.
Point 10: Contrary to the observations of some reflexive law
sociologists, I judge law and politics, at least in democratic societies,
to be among the most open, integrative, communicative social
subsystems. Sustainable development policies will have pervasive
reach and effect, and so need a blend of politics and law. Law and
politics, in turn, require inputs from three other broad subsystems-
science, economics, and a more amorphous system that I will call, for
now, "the community." For me, this suggests a definite role for law
in general, and for public or positive substantive law in particular, in
channeling the actions of government and of private parties toward
the achievement of sustainable development.
Conclusion
In closing, if reflexive law theory reintroduces missing
elements of within-system democratization and between-system coor-
dination, it can become an instructive and constructive legal theory
for sustainable development. Its emphasis on learning, reflection, and
relatively unconstrained adaptation fits nicely with the environmental
policy need for improved collection of data, consideration of alterna-
tives to current or planned actions, and timely, flexible response to
ecosystem dynamics and ever-changing environmental awareness. Its
emphasis on systems approaches and coordination among systems
reinforces the need to improve our legal approach to environmental
problems by encouraging multimedia evaluation of pollution and
ecosystem analysis of both pollution and other changes to natural
systems.
Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency in the reflexive law
literature to ignore democracy and social discourse. In its narrowest
definition, reflexive law can be challenged as deficient in legitimacy
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because it may lead to decisions by one subsystem, such as private
businesses, without adequate opportunities for participation by the
community at large. More broadly conceived, though, reflexive law
appropriately emphasizes the need for attention to procedural
formalities that promote communication and inform those who make
final decisions so that those decisions are made reflexively-that is,
with thought about how those decisions are likely to affect the very
people and systems that are making the decisions and with the
capacity to respond to feedback from the system. So long as system
coordination is properly understood to include exchange of informa-
tion and interaction between and among different social systems,
specifically including all levels of government and affected non-
governmental individuals and organizations, reflexive law reinforces
democratic participation and the opportunity for environmental policy
to incorporate important non-scientific values into the environmental
protection side of sustainable development and important non-
economic values into its human development side.
Sustainable development cannot succeed without robust
systems of democratic governance emphasizing freedom of choice
and the emergence of collective interests out of patterns of discourse
and behavior of autonomous individuals. Reflexive sustainable
development law needs to avoid the strict constraints of Teubner's
autopoietic variant and embrace the Habermasian discursive demo-
cracy features of Teubner's own original concept. Even with
information and interference systems in place, reflexive law
approaches, by themselves, do not offer a complete legal context for
sustainable development, as Teubner himself would be the first to
admit. Reflexive law will always need to be supplemented with
substantive law determined through legislation and regulation by
public authorities, which alone can legitimately express the integrated
values of the society and the specific goals to be established in pursuit
of those values.
